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Airplanes were invented by hobbyists and experimenters, and some personal computers were
as well. Similarly, many open-source software developers are interested in the software they
make, and not focused on proﬁt. Based on these cases, this paper has a model of agents called
tinkerers who want to improve a technology for their own reasons, by their own criteria, and
who see no way to proﬁt from it. Under these conditions, they would rather share their
technology than work alone. The members of the agreement form an information network.
The network’s members optimally specialize based on their opportunities in particular aspects
of the technology or in expanding or managing the network. Endogenously there are
incentives to standardize on designs and descriptions of the technology. A tinkerer in the
network who sees an opportunity to produce a proﬁtable product may exit the network to
create a startup ﬁrm and conduct focused research and development. Thus a new industry can
arise.
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1Some important technologies have been advanced by open sharing among innovators who
were not motivated mainly by prospective proﬁts. For example, many hobbyists around the world
tried to make aircraft in the late 1800s, before there were what we now call airplanes. Personal
computers were advanced greatly by hobbyists who met in groups, notably at the Homebrew
Computer Club (Freiberger and Swaine (1984) and Levy (2001)). Many open-source software
projects make source code publicly available. The airplane, personal computer, and open-source
software cases are examples of “open source” technology development processes.
Allen (1983) introduced the related term collective invention to describe ﬁrms sharing
technical information. Schrader (1991), Nuvolari (2002), and von Hippel (2005) offer other
examples. Harhoff, Henkel, and von Hippel (2003) model this phenomenon. In this literature, the
technology is known to deliver useful outputs, and the proﬁt-minded ﬁrms exchange information.
By contrast, this paper describes situations in which a novel technology appears ﬁrst because of
the combined efforts of people who do not expect to sell anything.
This paper places open source technology development in an abstract, deductive model.
Three key assumptions are necessary. First, agents called tinkerers are interested in advancing the
technology for some reason, such as their own inherent interest. Second, each tinkerer sees how
to improve the technology using his own criteria for improvement. Third, the tinkerers believe the
technology is so immature and uncertain that current actions do not signiﬁcantly affect future
opportunities for commercialization. Under these conditions, tinkerers share their technologies
with one another, forming an an open-source network.
Within the model, a new industry appears when a tinkerer envisions a way to proﬁt from the
technology, and leaves the network to try that. In the cases described, amateur tinkerering
eventually led to increases in commercial output and productivity.
2I Examples of open-source technology development
I.A Before the airplane
For decades before there were functional airplanes, there was an international discussion
about wings and ﬂying machines. By the 1890s several journals and societies in France, Britain,
Germany, and the United States were devoted to this topic. Important experiments by Otto
Lilienthal, Samuel Langley, and Lawrence Hargrave advanced the ﬁeld.
A Chicago railroad engineer named Octave Chanute was inspired by the possibility that by
cooperating, experimenters around the world could make winged ﬂying machines a reality. He
visited many of them, and corresponded with many more. Chanute’s speeches and writings were
“noteworthy for fostering a spirit of cooperation and encouraging a free exchange of ideas among
the world’s leading aeronautical experimenters” (Stoff, 1997, p. iv). In his optimistically titled
1894 book Progress in Flying Machines, Chanute summarized and commented on hundreds of
kites, gliders, experimenters, authors, and theorists of aerial navigation. Newly interested people
learned about the subject from this important book. Wilbur and Orville Wright read it and
contacted Chanute.
Like many others, the Wrights discussed their experiments openly. Chanute visited them and
invited colleagues to participate in their effort. At Chanute’s invitation, Wilbur Wright made a
speech about their experiments at the Western Society of Engineers. Wilbur Wright published in
British and German aircraft journals. In other words, the Wrights took an open source perspective
on their technology as they advanced it.
In 1902 and 1903, the Wrights developed better wings and propellers than their predecessors,
partly because of the uniquely accurate and precise measurements they got from their wind tunnel
and its instrumentation. They began to withdraw from processes of open sharing as they believed
they were near to a successful powered glider ﬂight. (Crouch, 2002). They planned to protect
3their rights to patent and license their technology. This led to permanent conﬂicts with Chanute,
who was devoted to open-source processes of invention.
I.B The beginning of personal computers
In the 1970s many clubs of hobbyists were working on microcomputers. The Homebrew
Computer Club which met in Menlo Park and Palo Alto, California, starting in March, 1975 was
particularly central. Most of the people who attended were interested in making computers for
their own home use. At the ﬁrst meeting, “it turned out that six of the thirty-two had built their
own computer system of some sort, while several others had ordered Altairs” (Levy, 2001, p.
202). The Altair was a new kit for making a hobbyist computer.
Meetings were informal. “The group had no ofﬁcial membership, no dues, and was open to
everyone. The newsletter, offered free ...became a pointer to information sources and a link
between hobbyists.” (Freiberger and Swaine, 1984, p. 106) “They discussed what they wanted in
a club, and the words people used most were ‘cooperation’ and ‘sharing’.” (Levy, p. 202).
Homebrew meetings included a presentation, often of a demonstration of a club member’s latest
creation. Then there was “the Random Access session, in which everyone scrambled around the
auditorium to meet those they felt had interest in common with them. . . . . [M]uch information
had to be exchanged; they were all in unfamiliar territory” (Freiberger and Swaine, 1984, p. 106).
The information ﬂow was a cause and also an effect of the fact that they often used similar
parts, attempted similar projects, and read the same newsletters and magazines. Members were
drawn to the hands-on experience of making computers and understanding the component parts,
not theories of computing, or the social effects of computing. (Levy, 2001)
The Homebrew club of hobbyists had an important effect in moving personal computer
technology forward. There were many other places for hobbyists to get involved in this exciting
4area. There were a series of (U.S.) West Coast Computer Faires which gathered tremendous
interest and attendance. Hobbyists ran bulletin board personal computer systems to which people
could dial in and send email, and engaged in Usenet discussions on the Internet. Hobbyists did
this activity, mostly not for proﬁt.
At one Homebrew meeting, Steve Wozniak demonstrated a new board which could do many
things a computer would do. He did not intend to start a company or sell anything, but his
entrepreneurial friend Steve Jobs convinced him to cofound a company and to sell this product as
a computer, which they called the Apple I. Only computer hobbyists could use it, but among them
it was quickly in demand. The personal computer industry took off with this device.
Apple Computer, and perhaps twenty other companies, were started by Homebrew attendees.
But the club started because of an interest in computers, not business.
I.C Open source software projects
In open-source software, human-readable source code ﬁles are made widely available on a
computer network. Source code, in computer languages, is fed as input to specialized
development tool programs, such as interpreters, compilers, assemblers, and linkers, which
generate the instructions which a computer eventually executes.
Sharing source code makes it possible for many programmers to experiment and improve the
code in parallel. A user may also alter the program for a particular purpose. Sponsors of open
source projects usually copyright the software in a way that allows a wide spectrum of uses.
Revisions are published under the same license. This is a powerful mechanism to support
collective invention because it is common knowledge that some later improvements will become
part of the shared code.
The owners of a chunk of source code moderate the ﬁnal choices in released versions of the
5software. Users may make a version different from a released one. The owners try to avoid the
project’s source code “forking” into permanently divergent, partly-incompatible versions. If that
were to happen, the project’s members would lose some of the beneﬁts of having one code base
which improved along many dimensions over time.
Several roles and institutions support sharing in open source projects:
• Web servers store the source code.
• Intellectual property claims are explicitly preempted by special open copyrights.
• The relevant programmers have similar development tools and skills.
• Source control programs keep records of who changed the software and how.
• Moderators or “owners” control which of those changes are published.
• Culturally, experimentation is welcome and unrestricted.
Such projects have been started by individuals with many different interests. The operating
system Linux, for example, was started, sponsored, and organized by a student, Linus Torvalds.
Now it is a core product of ﬁrms with hundreds of millions of dollars in revenue annually. Many
other projects such as Apache and Firefox also have this form. Open source software projects
often have an explicit copyright condition to keep the core technology in the public domain.
II Motivation and psychology
The model which follows is meant to describe the airplane experimenters and also hobbyists,
hackers, and innovators of the computer age such as Steve Wozniak (developer of the Apple I
personal computer), Richard Stallman (a deﬁning programmer of the free-software movement),
Tim Berners-Lee (inventor of the World Wide Web’s browsers and servers), and Linus Torvalds
(the founding programmer of the Linux operating system). These innovators created important
technologies without intending to sell them.
6Such innovators have various motivations. They may ﬁnd a project inherently absorbing and
enjoyable. They may beneﬁt from some service it provides. These are sometimes called intrinsic
motivations. They may anticipate receiving honors, prestige, wealth, or career beneﬁts from the
project, which are extrinsic motivations. They may anticipate that the project could improve the
human condition apart from themselves, which is an altruistic motivation. The model to follow
directly incorporates intrinsic or altruistic motivations, and demonstrates how certain network
behaviors emerge.
Important aircraft experimenters referred to their intrinsic or altruistic motivations:
• “A desire takes possession of man. He longs to soar upward and to glide, free as the bird
...” (Otto Lilienthal, 1889).
• “The glory of a great discovery or an invention which is destined to beneﬁt humanity
[seemed] ...dazzling. ...Otto and I were amongst those [whom] enthusiasm seized at an
early age.” (Gustav Lilienthal, 1912 introduction).
• ”The writer’s object in preparing these articles was ...[to ascertain] whether men might
reasonably hope eventually to ﬂy through the air ...[and] To save ...effort on the part of
experimenters ...” (Chanute, 1894).
• “I am an enthusiast ...as to the construction of a ﬂying machine. I wish to avail myself of
all that is already known and then if possible add my mite to help on the future worker who
will attain ﬁnal success” (from Wilbur Wright’s 1899 letter to the Smithsonian Insitution
requesting information).
• “Our experiments have been conducted entirely at our own expense. At the beginning we
had no thought of recovering what we were expending, which was not great ...” (Orville
Wright, 1953, p. 87).
7The motivation of hardware hackers was often instrinsic or altruistic too. After the ﬁrst
meeting of the Homebrew Club, Steve Wozniak reports (Wozniak, 2006, pp 156-7):
I started to sketch out on paper what would later come to be known as the Apple
I. ...I did this project for a lot of reasons. For one thing, it was a project to show the
people at Homebrew that it was possible to build a very affordable computer ...with
just a few chips. In that sense, it was a great way to show off my real talent, my talent
of coming up with clever designs, designs that were efﬁcient and affordable. By that I
mean designs that would use the fewest components possible.
I also designed the Apple I because I wanted to give it away for free to other
people. I gave out schematics for building my computer at the next meeting I
attended.
This was my way of socializing and getting recognized. I had to build something
to show other people. And I wanted the engineers at Homebrew to build computers
for themselves ...
Open source developers have a similar mix of motives. Lakhani and Wolf (2003) show based
on surveys that many programmers participate in open source projects because of the creative
enjoyment and the value of using the output, not explicit rewards. Pavlicek (p. 146) reports that
”Open Source people are used to doing work on a project because they perceive its value to the
community.”
It is difﬁcult to deﬁne in output or engineering terms what the tinkerers, hobbyists, or hackers
are accomplishing in the short run. The devices or software do not work well, and they are not
clearly commensurable, because they are qualitatively different attempts to make a desirable
design. In the model to follow, progress is therefore not measured by attributes of the artifacts, but
by the individual’s own satisfaction with it, that is, in terms of utility.
III A tinkerer
Let us deﬁne an individual called a tinkerer who enjoys a technological activity A. The
notation A stands for aircraft or some other hobbyist activity such as building a computer or
8writing a computer program at home. A has no market value, and no honors or proﬁts are
associated with it. The tinkerer may imagine that there may someday be honors or proﬁts, but
thinks this is unlikely and assigns a low expected value to such possibilities.
The tinkerer receives a periodic ﬂow of positive utility at directly from the existence of A in
period t. Let a0 ≥ 1 be a parameter deﬁning the utility received in period zero, the present period,
and treat the choice about tinkering separately from all other utility decisions. The tinkerer values
alternative choices in a risk-neutral way according to the net present sum of expected future utility
payoffs. Utility to be received in future periods is discounted by a β ∈ (0,1) for each intervening
period. Using a standard time series summation ((1 − β)(
∞ P
t=0
βt) = 1), expected utility at time
zero can be put into a closed form:
(1) EUt=0 = a0 + βa0 + β














The tinkerer can choose to invest in (“tinker with”) A in order to raise future beneﬁts at. An
investment costs one utility unit in the present period representing the effort, expenses, and the
opportunity costs of time involved. The agent anticipates that tinkering will raise his future utility
by p units in each time period in the future. The notation p stands for progress which the agent
experiences subjectively. We assume p is ﬁxed, positive, and that the tinkerer’s forecast is correct.
A tinkerer chooses whether to tinker based on the estimated costs and beneﬁts. The utility
beneﬁts from one effort to tinker have the value p in each subsequent period. The discounted




4 + ... =
pβ
1 − β
The investment required to receive this payoff is one utility unit at time zero so the net payoff
to tinkering in period zero is
pβ
1−β − 1. Beneﬁts exceed cost when p >
1−β
β . For example, if
9β = 0.95 and p = 0.07, tinkering in the current period brings a positive surplus of
.07∗.95
.05 − 1 = .33.
Unless parameters or conditions change, any tinkerer who ﬁnds it worthwhile to tinker once
will ﬁnd it worthwhile to tinker again and again. As long as p >
1−β
β , the agent will tinker in
every period, receiving payoff of a0 − 1 in the current period, a0 + p − 1 in period one, and in
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(1 − β)2 (2)
10The ﬁrst term of equation 2 expresses the present value of expected utility from A in its
original state. The second term is the present value of the costs of endless tinkering. The third
term is the present value of the beneﬁts expected from endless tinkering.
For a tinkerer characterized by β = 0.95 and p = 0.07, the gain in expected utility from
tinkering forever is the sum of the second and third terms:
pβ





(0.05)2 − 20 =
1.33
.05
− 20 = 6.6
So, for these parameters (which will be used throughout the paper to facilitate comparison),
endless tinkering increases the tinkerer’s utility by 6.6 times the cost of a one-time investment.
This self-motivated tinkerer is a perpetual innovation machine.
IV A network of tinkerers
To get to the main proposition quickly, we make simple and extreme assumptions. Later
sections relax the underlying assumptions.
Let there be two tinkerers with identical utility functions working on similar projects A1 and
A2 whose innovative tinkerings could be useful to one another. Each tinkerer believes that the
other cannot proﬁt from the project using any foreseeable version of the existing technology. Let
the subjective rate of progress of the ﬁrst player be p1, and the subjective rate of progress of
player two be p2.
Suppose the two tinkerers can make a veriﬁable and enforceable agreement to share a
well-deﬁned set of the functional design changes in A1 and A2 and their experimentally
discovered effects. This agreement forms a network for future information. At any time, either
partner can depart from the network, and then ceases to share his subsequent innovations and
11ceases to learn from the other tinkerer.
Let fraction f ∈ (0,1) of each tinkerer’s innovation be perceived as useful to the other one’s
project, so that knowing tinkerer two’s most recent innovation would beneﬁt tinkerer one by fp2
each turn. The remaining fraction (1 − f) does not carry over because the projects are not
identical and perhaps there are costs to interacting.
If the tinkerers expect each other to produce a positive ﬂow of innovations, they are always
better off by joining in a network. If they tinker and share with these parameters forever, tinkerer









(1 − β)2 +
fp2β
(1 − β)2
The new fourth term expresses the beneﬁts player one receives from the ﬂow of information
coming from player two. Because of this free good, utility is greater in equation (3) than in
equation (2). The tinkerer prefers joining a network rather than working alone. Thus under these
assumptions, rational agents generate open-source technology networks. This is the central
analytical result of this paper.
V Standardizing, specializing, and consensus redesign
Only a fraction f ∈ (0,1) of the experimental discoveries made by player two are usable to
player one. Suppose that for cost cs, a tinkerer can adjust some elements of his project to look
more like the other one’s project, and that doing so would raise the fraction of innovations of the
other tinkerer which apply to his own project from f to f2. If tinkerer one pays this cost to









(1 − β)24 +
fp2β
(1 − β)2 − cs +
(f2 − f)p2β
(1 − β)2
Comparing this to equation 3, a tinkerer would pay the standardization cost if:
βp2(f2 − f)
(1 − β)2 > cs
In words, a player beneﬁts more from standardization if, holding other things constant: (a) other
tinkerers produce a large ﬂow of innovations p2; (b) the cost of standardization, cs, is small; (c)
the increase in usable innovations (f2 − f) is large; and (d) the tinkerer is patient for results (β is
close to 1). Intuitively, these are the conditions under which it makes sense for a software
developer to replace a working piece of code by a standard library of code written by others.
The same argument can explain why experimenters tend to develop a common technical
language to describe their technologies. This can reduce communication costs and also clarify
thinking. For example, Wilbur Wright published a journal article (Wright, 1902) asking other
experimenters to cease using “angle of incidence” to mean the angle between a wing (or other
airfoil) and the ground. The better deﬁnition, he argued, was the angle between the airfoil and the
ﬂow of air coming at it; the angle with respect to the ground was not relevant. This request was an
effort both to improve the thinking processes of other experimenters and to lower frictional losses
in communication. In a more important example, Lawrence Hargrave’s experiments showed that
a box-shaped kite was more stable than a ﬂat kite in a gust of wind. This specialist contribution
helped glider ﬂyers standardize on a biplane (two wing) design for gliders.
Both kinds of standardization partly explain why tinkerers would agree to publish their
ﬁndings. The fewer differences between experiments there are, the lower future communication
and adoption costs will be. It beneﬁts player one in communication if his preferred language and
13concepts are available to both players. If a tinkerer anticipates adopting part of another’s
tinkerer’s technology at some time in the future, he lowers the future cost of that adoption by
giving the other tinkerer a chance to use his own technology now. It also means they would be
able to compare options for standardization and choose the best one, in the sense of moving the
project forward or raising f more. This incentive could be formalized by making f() a decreasing
function of a player’s own history of making new ﬁndings public. An experimenter who publishes
more makes it easier for other players to communicate with him or to learn from his design
choices. If f is a declining function of the number of ﬁndings a player has shared, it partly
substitutes for the enforcement of the rule that players should share all their ﬁndings. Each one
has an incentive to share in order to get the others to learn from his own ﬁndings, and to
standardize on his own choices (rather than having to pay the costs of standardizing on the
choices of others).
A tinkerer may invest in redesign to make the device easier to learn or easier to use, because
it represents progress p or makes it easier to exchange information, raising f. This is important in
the software context where a project can “fork” (split over time into incompatible versions used
by different people) if the contributors do not agree to standardize enough. In the history of Unix
there was a painful fork, and programmers refer to this history to convince others to keep projects
uniﬁed even as they work independently. In this model, they are willing to pay some price to
maintain the large network on the project. A redesign to achieve a consensus and avoid forking is
therefore rationalized by the ﬂow of future exchanges that are possible if the players can avoid
forking.
For f = 0.5, f2 = 0.54, p1 = 0.07, and β = 0.95, the payoff to standardization is
p2β(f2−f)
(1−β)2 = .07∗.95∗.04
.05∗.05 = 1.064. In this illustration, if the cost of the standardization investment
were one utility unit, like the cost of a normal investment, it would be just worth undertaking.
Thus standardization and specialization are natural outcomes of exchanging information to
develop a technology. They can occur without any necessary reference to competition or market
14exchange. The network is a search technology which provides the tinkerer with information he
values and does not obtain by experiment.
VI Joining, searching, or matching costs
Perhaps there are costs to ﬁnding a match partner or joining together once a match is found.
Let cj be the immediate cost in utility terms to a tinkerer for joining a sharing institution or
starting one with a known partner. The gross beneﬁts of joining the group are again
fp2β
(1−β)2, and if
cj is less than this, the tinkerer would prefer to join than to work alone.
So the model predicts the tinkerer joins, ceteris paribus, if (1) costs of joining, cj, are small
enough, (2) the ﬂow of innovations from the others in the group, p2, is large enough, (3) the
innovations are relevant enough to his own project, as measured by f, and (4) the tinkerer’s
valuation of future events, β, is high enough.
The same comparison applies if cj is the cost for a tinkerer to search for a network or
candidates to join an existing network. This parameter can incorporate the real-world problem
that usually few people know a network exists and how to communicate with it. The problem is
addressed in the real world by members who write books, edit journals, make speeches, talk about
their hobby to outside people, or broadcast emails.
There might be many tinkerers, working in isolation, making almost no progress because
they do not share. Here we have a situation in which an information failure alone prevents a
Pareto-improving institution from appearing. Probably there are many situations in which
tinkerers would join a network, but the search costs are such that they do not ﬁnd one another. If
one thinks of tinkerers as a natural resource, institutional attributes of the environment (like the
presence of the Internet) affect whether they can ﬁnd one another and work together and their
speed of progress.
15An individual tinkerer might specialize in expanding the network, e.g. through
speech-making, book-writing or other publicity. Tinkerers who make A easier to learn or easier to
use can also lower search costs by making it easier for others to see the virtues of A.
We do see such editor/moderators in the cases of interest:
• Aircraft experimenter and author Octave Chanute had a strong interest in open sharing of
information. He expressed affection for the point of view of Lawrence Hargrave, who on
principle published all his results and patented nothing, with the idea that this open-source
approach would maximize the speed of collective progress.
• In the Homebrew computer club, Lee Felsenstein, who usually moderated the meetings,
established a ”Random Access” interaction time for people to talk to whoever could help
them.
• In the open source software cases, charismatic founders or charismatic projects draw in
interest, and the programmers are explicitly and routinely encouraged to share innovations,
sometimes by the licensing agreement.
VII Intellectual property
Some of the innovators discussed preferred to avoid formal intellectual property claims and
institutions, such as patents, which might get in the way of using a technology. Pioneering aircraft
experimenter Lawrence Hargrave and programmer Richard Stallman are examples. This behavior
can be rationalized in this model. Effort devoted to establishing intellectual property rights in an
unproﬁtable technology may not pay off as well as sharing which pushes the technology forward.
One can formally illustrate this. For simplicity, consider a two-tinkerer case. Assume all the
utility functions are linear in money and have been normalized to the money metric, and that none
16of them expect to be make a commercial product. Suppose each tinkerer has property rights to his
designs and can charge a price to use the design information he transmits to the network. He may
impose a cost c1 for each information transmission on each network member who makes use of it.
With one network partner, a tinkerer receives c1 times fp1 in copyright payments, and pays out c2
times fp2. This pattern of zero-sum exchanges is proﬁtable to the tinkerers who produce the
greatest ﬂow of innovations, but some of the others may ﬁnd it too expensive enough to stay in
the network, which slows overall progress.
More realistically, if there are many partners and frictional costs to deﬁning, managing, or
enforcing intellectual property rights, private ownership may bring the tinkerers greater social
costs than social beneﬁts. For both reasons, tinkerers in the model are better off and more willing
to participate in networking if the rules of the game do not include the deﬁnition and protection of
intellectual property.
That changes when commercialization to a broader market, beyond the tiny population of
tinkerers, is likely. So far the model has not considered the mixed incentives faced by a tinkerer
who anticipates selling a product some day. That tinkerer faces a perceived opportunity cost if he
does not create a barrier to competition. In one useful example, the Wrights changed their
behavior once they believed they were about to invent the airplane.
VIII Entrepreneurial exits from the network
Starting in late 1902, after they had run tests on wings in a wind tunnel, the Wrights were
decreasingly willing to share information. From Crouch (2002), p. 296:
The brothers had been among the most open members of the community prior to
this time. The essentials of their system had been freely shared with Chanute and
others. Their camp at Kitty Hawk had been thrown open to those men who they had
17every reason to believe were their closest rivals in the search for a ﬂying machine.
This pattern changed after fall 1902.
The major factor leading to this change was the realization that they had invented
the airplane. Before 1902 the Wrights had viewed themselves as contributors to a
body of knowledge upon which eventual success would be based. The breakthroughs
accomplished during the winter of 1901 and the demonstration of ... success on the
dunes in 1902 had changed their attitude.
They applied for a patent in March 1903, received it in 1906, and started an airplane
business. Chanute had criticized others who kepts secrets before, and he began to have conﬂicts
with the Wrights. These conﬂicts grew severe and in the end, Chanute and the brothers were no
longer on speaking terms.
This kind of split also occurred in the Homebrew club, whose attendees had tended to follow
what Levy (2001) called the Hacker Ethic – that information should be freely available. After
Apple and other companies were founded by its members, the experience at the club changed.
Members who had started companies stopped coming, partly because keeping company secrets
would be uncomfortable at Homebrew. From Levy (2001), p. 269:
No longer was it a struggle, a learning process, to make computers. So the
pioneers of Homebrew, many of whom had switched from building computers to
manufacturing computers, had not a common bond, but competition to maintain
market share. It retarded Homebrew’s time-honored practice of sharing all
techniques, of refusing to recognize secrets, and of keeping information going in an
unencumbered ﬂow. ...Now, as major shareholders of companies supporting
hundreds of employees, they had secrets to keep.
“It was amazing to watch the anarchists put on a different shirt,” [former
Homebrewer] Dan Sokol later recalled. “People stopped coming. Homebrew ...was
still anarchistic: people would ask you about the company, and you’d have to say, ‘I
can’t tell you that.’ I solved that the way other people did—I didn’t go. I didn’t want
to go and not tell people things. There would be no easy way out where you would
feel good about that. ...”
It no longer was essential to go to meetings. Many of the people in companies
like Apple, Processor Tech, and Cromemco were too damned busy. And the
companies themselves provided the communities around which to share information.
Apple was a good example. Steve Wozniak and his [friends and employees] Espinosa
and Wigginton, were too busy with the young ﬁrm to keep going to Homebrew.
18In the open source software world, analogous tensions arise between programmers who think
a particular program should be freely modiﬁable and reusable, and those who would allow a
business or person to have intellectual property rights over it. The subject of licensing is
complicated and philosophical, but the Free Software Foundation classically deﬁnes and defends
the free software concept, and private businesses take an interest in ownership of software code,
and there are a spectrum of views regarding various programs.
VIII.A Modeling entrepreneurial exits
In each of the historical episodes, ﬁrms burst out from networks of tinkerers to create an
industry. The transition is complicated. One altered assumption can make it happen mechanically
in the model. Earlier the assumption was made that the tinkerer could not see how to implement a
marketable form of the technology. One might say that a veil blocks the tinkerer’s view of better
forms of the technology. If that veil were to lift, the tinkerer might see how to produce a product.
Substantively, the new perception or belief about making an implementable product might be
caused by advances in the technology, or changes externally, or by internal reﬂection. For
simplicity, in this section the probability that the veil lifts each turn is ﬁxed, exogenous, and
known to the agent.
A generic derivation will help incorporate this into the model. Consider a one-time utility
payoff which arrives with probability π at the beginning of each future period. Denote the
unknown random period in which it arrives by s. We can compute the mean discount factor to
apply to this payoff, E[βs]. It is the probability-weighted average of the appropriate discount rates
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Suppose at some point a tinkerer (or an entrepreneur advising the tinkerer) envisions a
directed research and development process which would result in a proﬁtable product or service
based on project A. Suppose further that if the tinkerer were to continue to share experimental
ﬁndings universally, this would reduce the utility of the resulting monopolistic proﬁts by more
than the utility of staying in the network, so the tinkerer wishes to drop out of the tinkerer’s
network. Dropping out means entering a new game, in exchange for losing the payoffs a0, ceasing
to tinker with A, and ceasing to receive inﬂows of information from the other tinkerers, but
continuing to use information from past investments and inﬂows.
Let M be the present utility payoff of a large monopoly proﬁt minus the utility cost of
directed research and development, capital costs, risks, and the value of the future inﬂows of
information that would have come from the network of tinkerers, all computed at the instant the
tinkerer exits the network. Let π1 be the probability each turn that this tinkerer sees a opportunity
to take M, and π2 be the probability that the partner tinkerer does. Assume that these events
cannot occur in the same period. For intuition, assume these are small probabilities.
The time-zero present value of this prospective exit in unknown period s, is M discounted by
20E[βs], which is M times
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The mean utility cost of tinkering each period until s, falls analogously to 1
1−β+βπ. The mean







The inﬂow of information from the partner is cut off if either partner exits, so s arrives with
probability (π1 + π2) each turn until the end. Putting that into the generic derivation, the capital
value of inﬂows from other tinkerers falls to
fp2β
(1−β)(1−β+βπ1+βπ2). Combining these pieces, the
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The ﬁrst three terms now incorporate the possibility that these streams of utility will end, and
the fourth term incorporates the new payoff of leaving the network to take payoff M.
The previous results extend forward analogously with this adjusted discounting. The net
beneﬁt of redesigning, standardizing, or specializing to raise communication efﬁciency to f2
becomes
p2β(f2−f)(1−π1−π2)
(1−β)(1−β+βπ1+βπ2) − cs. The net beneﬁt of joining the network is
fp2β(1−π2)
(1−β)(1−β+βπ2) − cj.
For the tinkerer to prefer to exit the network when offered M, M must be at least as great as
the right side of equation 4, since at that level the tinkerer is indifferent between taking it or
continuing in the network. For the story to hold together, the exit value parameter M must satisfy:
M ≥
a0 − 1
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(1 − β)(1 − β + βπ1)
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21Using the previous parameters β = .95, a0 = 1, f = .5, f2 = .54, and p1 = p2 = .07, here is
how the payoffs change when the possibility of exits is included in a tinkerer’s forecasts:
Concept Expression
Without exits With exits
(π1 = π2 = 0) (π1 = π2 = .01)
Utility cost of 1
1−β+βπ1 -20 -16.81
future investments










minimum M 39.9 38.07
worth exiting for
The payoffs of being in the network are thus somewhat lower if the tinkerers expect members
to exit. Still, they are positive, so tinkerers would be willing to network in the near run if the entry
price is low enough. Even if the tinkerers expect to be in competition with one another, the
network might still hold up, depending on the parameters. To include this aspect would
complicate the model and is not attempted here. It does not seem to be very important in the
historical cases under consideration. The Wright Flyer Company did not compete mainly with
others who had previously been connected to Chanute. The early Apple Computer did not
compete mainly with other Homebrew Computer Club alumni. Open source software companies
are in practice cooperating as well as competing with the same network their founders were in
before they started their company. In these empirical cases, progress is more important than
competition in the mind of the tinkerer.
There are also more differentiated outcomes in real open source software situations than the
binary choice of exiting or staying in the network which was modeled. For example, the source
code to the operating system Linux is freely available on the Internet, but companies such as Red
Hat and SuSE/Novell develop and distribute it, and offer complementary products and services.
There are a variety of licenses for open source software which keep some of the source code in
22the public domain. These nuanced arrangements reduce the conﬂict inherent in the choice as it
was modeled.
The model makes explicit how tinkerers make progress before the industry starts, according
to utility maximization, not market criteria.
IX Relaxing the assumptions
IX.A Rates of progress
The assumption that each tinkerer achieves a high, steady, known rate of progress can be
relaxed in some cases, and still allow a tinkerer’s network to hold.
First, the assumption that progress occurs at a known ﬁxed rate is stronger than necessary,
although it is a useful simpliﬁcation. A more realistic description is that tinkerers see some stream
of opportunities to achieve progress as they deﬁne it. They have informed expectations about
experiments, based on their knowledge and experience. A tinkerer tries experiments, whose
outcomes are random. Tinkerers quit if dissatisﬁed with their progress. By self-selection, the
population of tinkerers tends to consist of those who can make effective progress, and the p in the
model is a long-run average for each member of this selected population. Modeled in this way,
the present value of utility could not be so readily computed analytically. The complexity thereby
introduced would distract from the main points of this model.
Second, the assumption that each tinkerer achieves a high enough rate of progress alone to
motivate his own efforts is not always necessary. Tinkerers could play other roles in a network.
Here are two examples:
• Suppose a tinkerer is in two networks which address different kinds of projects but
23occasionally some idea in each one is useful to tinkerers in the other. As an information
broker transmitting these cross-cutting ideas, a tinkerer may contribute enough to maintain
membership in both networks.
• A family member or friend of a tinkerer may encourage a tinkerer, express interest in the
project, and bounce ideas back and forth with the tinkerer. This helpful person would not
need to make any speciﬁc rate of progress or pay any joining cost to in essence become part
of the network, learn about the project, and seize on useful opportunities to help the tinkerer.
the progress that the tinkerer makes. Among the aerial experimenters there were several
pairs of brothers among the aerial experimenters. At least in the case of the Wrights, the
close collaboration helped the Wrights stick with the project through bad patches in which
there was not much success. Thus other relationships can support a network’s relationships.
Thus the assumption that every individual’s progress outpaces a discount rate is not strictly
necessary. The essential assumptions are that tinkerers are interested in common projects and can
make mutually helpful progress on them according to their own judgement.
IX.B Technological uncertainty
The model assumes an agent cannot sell the technology at a proﬁt, and cannot foresee how
such possibilities could occur in the future. This is an extreme version of technological
uncertainty, described in Tushman and Anderson (1986), Dosi (1988), and Rosenberg (1996). If
there is no technological uncertainty, and the path to a marketable design is clear, then, by perfect
foresight arguments, a proﬁt-seeking ﬁrm would do that immediately. So if tinkerers lead the way
technologically to a proﬁtable industry, there must have been technological uncertainty.
The model assumed that tinkerers operate under technological uncertainty and so could not
see how to make a version of A for which there would be enough demand to make a proﬁt. In
24casual conversation one might say that he does not see a version of A that is “good enough” to
sell, but with radically new products, both supply and demand may be hard to foresee. Several
early aircraft developers did not expect the rapid military adoption of aircraft. Early personal
computer makers dramatically underestimated demand. Tushman and Anderson (1986) used
errors in forecasts by industry analysts as a metric of technological uncertainty.
Because of this, investment and payback for tinkerers are unavoidably subjective in this
model. The experimenters do not know future forms of the output (whereas we can look back at a
well-deﬁned “invention of the airplane”). The improvements include qualitative redesign and
“failed” experiments. A tinkerer may expect to have a better understanding of the activity after an
experiment, whether or not it improves A in functional terms, and it may beneﬁt other tinkerers to
know about that experiment. Therefore the model incorporates subjective progress, and does not
measure progress by engineering or market attributes of A.
IX.C Scale and population size
The model has only one relationship between two tinkerers, but each can be connected to
groups or networks beyond. So the network model can scale up. As modeled, all participants
contribute information to create a positive sum interchange, potentially having positive
externalities. There is positive feedback, because fast progress makes a network more appealing
to join. Its expansion is limited because experimenters in frontier technologies are rare.
For tinkerers of a given level of interest and capability, a larger network makes faster
progress than a small one. So members have an incentive to reduce barriers to communication
within the network, or with people who might join the network. This beneﬁt of scale implies that
networks with fewer barriers will address technical problems better or more quickly than
networks with more barriers. For example, the use of English to discuss an open source project
may improve the speed of development if more potential programmers can participate in English.
25This suggests that, holding other things constant, open source innovation will tend to be more
successful when tinkerers communicate in a language many people know, and in locations with
less restriction on printing or association with other people. If there are many tinkerers, the
network will probably have greater internal friction, and require administrative structures of
information sharing (as in open source software), which are not modeled here.
IX.D Motivation
The tinkerer is imagined to have intrinsic or altruistic motivations. But a network can form in
support of a proﬁt-making or career effort of the tinkerer too, as long as the other tinkerers do not
see it as a zero-sum competition. So for example a government laboratory’s programmers may
contribute to an open source software development effort if it is useful to their project, or a
cost-reducing effort could be co-sponsored by competing ﬁrms.
A tinkerer’s motivation could include not only the possible honor of making a major
invention, but also the possible second-best prize of being recognized and cited by the ﬁnal
inventor. Such streams of payoffs can be viewed as a portion of a rate of progress p. The model
also excludes any payoffs experienced in sharing what one has done with others, although
innovators report the opportunity to share is beneﬁcial and satisfying.
In the examples that motivate this model, the tinkerers do not yet know much about how to
make a good A because the technology cannot yet be usefully implemented. The number of
tinkerers who can make experimental progress on a particular type of project is limited to those
with the knowledge, wealth, and tools to attempt it. Many people could value experimenting with
new aircraft, but few like it enough, and are good enough at it, and have the resources, to bother.
Those few have opportunities to make something that looks like progress to them. One might
imagine that values of a0, the original payoff of activity A, were drawn from a distribution, and
the few people with a sufﬁciently positive value for a0 would be tinkerers. In the aircraft case,
26even successful experimenters considered quitting, and many did.
Once a technology is established and competitively produced, the basic uncertainties have
been resolved, so the model loses relevance. Today, there is an established spectrum of
technologies for making aircraft and personal computers and delivering services to and from
them. Technological uncertainty still exists within narrower domains that could be relevant for the
model.
IX.E Enforceability
In the model, tinkerers would be willing to agree to an enforced open-source contract rather
than work alone. But in the case of gliders leading to the airplane, there was no exogenous
enforcement. There are several sources of incentive besides technological progress to support an
open-source pattern which were not modeled here.
• Innovators may feel an obligation to share with the group, so enforcement is internal to
each tinkerer. Meyer (2003) discusses some examples.
• Innovators may want their peers to see their work because they are proud of it and will be
favorably recognized for it, as discussed in Raymond (2001) and Levy (2001). Unlike a0 in
the model, this payoff directly supports open-source relationships, and does not depend on
an information ﬂow back from the other person.
• If an invention delivers more output when it has more users, inventors may beneﬁt more by
giving it away than by keeping it secret or charging a fee to examine or use it. For example,
since Web browsers were invented, many have been given away to make collaboration and
information tracking easier (Berners-Lee, 1999).
• In the model of Bessen and Maskin (2006), proﬁt-making ﬁrms are willing to share
innovation information openly with one another if they are following different paths of
27research or if the innovations they expect to make will be useful to achieving future ones.
For tinkerers, one might model this by raising the rate of progress each tinkerer expects if
more sources of information are available.
• Tinkerers may gain more from interaction if they are familiar with one another’s work.
Adapting this model, f could rise over time as the network’s members develop longer
histories together.
• To a tinkerer who anticipates someday selling a product or service, the population of
tinkerers inside the network may be the natural market of early adopters for it. Interaction
with others helps the tinkerer know what customers will want, and creates an opportunity to
earn their trust. At ﬁrst only specialists could understand and appreciate the aircraft,
personal computers, and new types of software discussed earlier.
Given incentives like these, sustaining the agreement can be rational for each individual
participant. The enforceable contract in this paper is a modeling shortcut. More accurate stories
may require a more complex model.
IX.F Frictions, diseconomies of scale, or other costs
As written, the model incorporates the extreme assumption that there are no economies or
diseconomies of sharing with more and more people. For example, it is implicitly assumed that
there is no time constraint in keeping up with the relevant literature, nor cost for communicating
to yet another person, nor changing marginal cost to enforce the sharing agreement. One could
incorporate such inﬂuences by making f a function of the number of participants to generate
increasing returns to scale (encouraging evangelism) or decreasing returns to scale (inducing
pressure to reduce or exclude members).
Many aspects of the environment affect f. If, for example, communication between the
28tinkerers are noisy or clogged with unhelpful communication, such as email spam, f is lower. If
the languages of technical communications are different, f is lower. An American experimenter
working on gliders may naturally choose not to read a French journal about balloon developments,
even if the balloon work is productive in its own terms (measured by p2), either because he cannot
read French, or because he thinks balloon innovations are unlikely to apply to gliders.
The model implies there are no expensive capital or training requirements. In the examples,
tinkering was not usually capital-intensive. It appears that once expensive equipment is necessary
for some activity, that activity falls beyond the boundaries of a network of tinkerers, except
perhaps inside an organization. Also, tinkering tends to arise in environments where not much
specialized training is required.
X Conclusion
A network of tinkerers model applies to innovative processes in which:
• Individuals communicate novel technical ﬁndings and designs about a technology to one
another without explicit compensation.
• Experimenters do not have extrinsic rewards, largely because they are working on
something that has no obvious price or does not ﬁt into an existing, standard product market
at the time they enter the ﬁeld.
• Some participants specialize in managing or expanding the network.
• The activity evolves over time, in response to events that participants interpret as progress,
such as discoveries or inventions. For example, when Hargrave reported results from his
box kite experiments, other aeronautical experimenters learned and adapted to the ﬁndings
29without imitating his experiments. Thus they behaved as if they were responding to a
discovery of a natural law or invention, not performing for others or engaging in a sport.
Given such a situation, the model predicts that participants specialize in aspects of the
technology, and standardize on some tools, as opportunities permit. The framework assumes
predictions about the future form or importance of the technology are diverse and uncertain in the
sense of Dosi (1988) and Rosenberg (1996). It predicts that members who do not plan to sell a
related product quickly will object to intellectual property impositions. And it predicts the kind of
ferment which can lead participants to jump out into entrepreneurial ventures, whose value is
difﬁcult to predict in the sense used by Tushman and Anderson (1986). The model predicts
progress would be slowed by high costs to invest in experimentation or to ﬁnd and join networks.
Examples of this process occurred in the invention of the airplane, the invention of the
personal computer, and in the development of open source softare programs. There is a spectrum
of similar kinds of innovative development:
• Shared creative content can be like open-source software. The Wikipedia, for example, is a
public domain encyclopedia written principally by unpaid users. The collection of video
content at YouTube.com is donated by users. In these cases the pooled content is not made
up of functional engineering achievements. Instead the developers are sharing text,
reasoning, and media. The library grows with contributions from many users to advance in
a direction they more or less agree upon. Such shared content is similar to open source
software.
• Open science. The rise of “open science” institutions which motivate, support, and enforce
open publication of scientiﬁc ﬁndings, was supported by competition between patrons to
employ prestigious and effective scientiﬁc innovators (David, 1998). Through the network
of tinkerers story, open science would also be supported by people who wish to speed the
progress of science.
30• User innovation, in which a company produces a product and its users generate user
innovations, as deﬁned and discussed in von Hippel (2006), which also provides many
examples.
• “Skunkworks”, projects of creative engineering inside corporations in which engineers
work around an employer’s hierarchy, rather than obeying it. Their goal may be for the
organization to succeed despite its managers. The model offers a way to think of such
actors less as shirking, and more like visionaries, as they think of themselves.
• The British Industrial Revolution after 1750 occurred in a place and time when printers
were allowed more freedom about what to print than printers elsewhere. This helped
support an estimated 1020 technical and scientiﬁc societies (Inkster, 1991, pp 71-79).
Workshops of the time were often open to visitors, and they generated, by one account, ”a
wave of gadgets [which] swept [over] Britain” (Mokyr, 1993, p. 16, citing Ashton). Mokyr
(1993, p. 33) concluded: “The key to British technological success was that it had a
comparative advantage in microinventions.”
• The Internet and the Web expand the opportunities for technological discussion.
This model provides a formal structure to describe developers of radically new technology.
Some innovators make fast progress on their own, although it may not look like progress to other
people. Others make sufﬁcient progress to perservere, if they have exogenous links to one
another. Independent innovators have an incentive to join networks and share ﬂows of
information. An innovator with comparative advantages in recruitment, publicity, moderating
conversation, publishing, or editing journals may end up doing those things because that moves
the project forward faster than if this person worked directly on the technology. Much of this can
be understood and discussed in terms of progress rates p, fractional ﬂows of useful information f,
and differentiated opportunities for each person. Players may imagine proﬁtable future exit
opportunities but if these are remote or improbable enough, joining the network makes sense until
31participants actually see those opportunities.
Tinkerers in the model choose to combine their information to maximize the combined ﬂow
of useful innovations. The speedup in the ﬂow of innovations is therefore endogenous. In the
model, purposeful choice generates ﬂows of innovation that other economic models of
technological change often take as given. When technological uncertainty is great, tinkerers
networks can eventually form an industry, once enough tinkerers can anticipate commercial
possibilities from their activities.
The desire of people to make their world a better place is a kind of natural resource. The
environment affects their effectiveness. If publishing a journal, forming an association, and
traveling are costly or ofﬁcially discouraged, innovators facing technological uncertainty would
be less effective. In this model that would reduce their utility. In the real world they might
respond by reducing effort, keeping innovations secret, or emigrating to a location where the
environment was more favorable. So noisy or restricted communications channels can reduce the
ﬂow of innovations both by reducing the ﬂow of communication, and by driving tinkerers away.
In this model, innovation is generated by individuals not organizations. One beneﬁt of
modeling innovation this way is that the predictions and intuitions often apply outside the context
of businesses and hierarchies, as in production prior to capitalism, or communications inside or
between organizations.
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